Princeton - 8 days ago

It is familiar to speak of the Constitution as made by The People, and popular involvement in, and control over, constitution-making has a claim to be an important principle of political morality. The fashionable idea of constituent power entails that the Constitution is made, and can be unmade, by the legally unbounded power of The People. But most persons in most places at most times have no involvement in constitution-making, and indeed, the Constitution may make popular involvement exceedingly difficult. This lecture reflects on the ways in which constitutions are inherited from those who come before us, asking how, if at all, the idea of inheritance can be reconciled with the ideal of self-government. The lecture explores the moral importance of continuity in constitutional forms and the importance of continuing capacity to revise, perhaps even radically, one’s inheritance. Professor Richard Ekins works on questions in constitutional law and practice and in legal and political philosophy, with a particular focus on lawmaking, interpretation, and self-government. He leads Policy Exchange’s Judicial Power Project, edits the American Journal of Jurisprudence (with Jeff Pojanowski), and jointly directs the Programme for the Foundations of Law and Constitutional Government in the University of Oxford. He was made King’s Counsel Honoris Causa in 2022 in recognition of his “major contribution to public debate, and parliamentary deliberation, about the constitutional role of the courts.” He is the author of The Nature of Legislative Intent (OUP, 2012) and co-author of Legislated Rights: Securing Human Rights through Legislation (CUP, 2018).

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